the study of international law. International law is, therefore, conceived as both a ''normative order'' and a ''factor of social organization''.
13 Section I addresses these two ideas: first, the hegemonic construction of international law that suggests that the development of international law and the international legal system are not based on any collective values, 14 and second, the so-called Hobbesian presentation alleging a value-less construction of international society and its legal framework. 15 In this section, the article outlines the foundations of international society and its legal order as a system based on collective values. It argues for the existence of a value-based international society having a fundamental role in international law-making. It establishes that the normative conflicts that result from the clash of two treaties are in effect value conflicts. This section also touches on the effect of ''regionalism'', or particular orientations of legal thought and culture, 16 on the universalization of values in international law, with particular reference to the debate on ''Asian Values''.
17 Section I concludes by reiterating that a value-oriented reading of international law not only facilitates a better understanding of normative conflicts but also provides a valid legal basis to resolve them.
Section II elaborates on the value-based paradigm of treaty conflicts. Here, in contrast to the general understanding of treaty conflicts as the conflicts of parallel rights or obligations, the article argues that they should instead be understood as conflicts of values representing interests. Section III establishes that the normative tools contained in the VCLT 18 or outside its framework fail to provide adequate legal solutions to resolve treaty conflicts and fall back on the unprincipled political determination of these conflicts by party states. It explains why treaty conflicts cannot be resolved by reviewing tactical considerations regarding conflicting norms, 19 but would instead require value-oriented thinking about the forms and functions of treaty norms and of the international legal system as a whole. Section IV analyzes how courts and tribunals deal with the issue of treaty conflicts. The analysis uncovers the incompetence of the so-called ''principle of political decision'', which would leave the resolution of treaty conflicts to political considerations. The article shows how courts and tribunals are empowered and, despite their avoidance of the 
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Martti Koskenniemi is a leading contemporary advocate of the hegemonic construction of international law, and the ILC's Report on Fragmentation (supra note 1) also presents the same notion of international law. The present article will discuss Koskenniemi's several scholarly writings in this regard, especially this article: Martti KOSKENNIEMI, ''International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration' ' (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197.
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issue, compelled to consider and pronounce on treaty conflicts. It also shows how they evaluate norms, in terms of interests and values, and determine hierarchy among them. Finally, Section V gives a summary of conclusions. This article does not claim, however, that fundamental value conflicts can always be resolved judicially in the decentralized international legal system. It is also acknowledged that the actions of the members of international society can neither be always motivated nor compelled by the social forces calling for legal determinations of normative conflicts.
20 Furthermore, this article does not advocate that the valuebased ordering of conflicting treaty norms will absolve a state from responsibility under international law for the breach of one of two conflicting treaty obligations. It also does not contribute towards the debate on the determination of hierarchy among treaties on the basis of their subjective characterization.
i. values in international law
A norm represents a value, and a value represents interests in terms of benefits or advantages that an individual or a community derives from that norm.
22 A society desirous of impeding the construction of factual and counter-factual recurrences that may impair values constructs norms by recruiting specific value representations. Accordingly, any discourse in the construction of international law that disconnects norms from the represented values blurs the necessary component of the social element in international law-making. In real-life situations, norms may conflict with one another, with the resolution of these conflicts being of foremost importance for any legal system. Once we hold that every norm represents a value, these normative conflicts can be treated as conflicts of values. This juxtaposition of norms with values helps us better understand and solve the normative conflicts.
Martti Koskenniemi, however, presents international law as a technique of articulating political claims in terms of legal rights and duties. 23 He holds that the construction of international law is based on unilateral pronouncements of selfappointed hegemonic states. 24 He rejects the existence of any ''absolutes'' of international law, and describes international law as ''a process of articulating
20.
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political preferences into legal claims that cannot be detached from the conditions of political contestation in which they are made''. 25 Although the hegemonic patterns of international legal order cannot be altogether brushed aside, I contend that due to the interdependency of its members, international society is experiencing a gradual evolution that is revolutionizing the nature of international law.
26 There is indeed a gradual subordination of individual sovereignties to the common good and the absorption into contemporary international law of the values that this common good encompasses.
27
The proclamation of concepts like ''interest of mankind as a whole'', ''international community of states as a whole'', or ''common heritage of mankind'' explains why the international community recognizes, for example, a ban on the unilateral use of force or insists on the promotion of the right of peoples to self-determination or the protection of human rights. In other words, there is a collective experience in international society of being part of an integrated system reflecting and protecting the deepest values and most basic expectations of its subjects. This collective experience does not rest only on immediate calculations of utility, 28 but is instead progressing towards those ''absolutes of international law'', which also becomes the basis of resolving normative conflicts.
As a consequence of functional and regional fragmentation, the International Law Commission's (ILC) Report recognizes the loss of an ''overall perspective of law''.
29
However, it absolutely connects the nature and development of international law with its being a means of articulating political preferences as legal claims, which cannot therefore be detached from the conditions of political contestation in which they are made. 30 The ILC Report, indeed, explicitly states that political preferences drive the development of international law:
In law, political struggle is waged on what legal words such as ''aggression'', ''selfdetermination'', ''self-defence'', ''terrorist'' or jus cogens mean, whose policy will they include, whose will they oppose. To think of this struggle as hegemonic is to understand that the objective of the contestants is to make their partial view of that meaning appear as the total view, their preference seem like the universal preference. (emphasis in the original)
31
Koskenniemi similarly claims that international law ''is a surface over which political opponents engage in hegemonic practices, trying to enlist its rules, principles and institutions on their side, making sure they do not support the adversary''. 
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From a different perspective, Jean d'Aspremont also rejects the existence of a value system in the international legal order.
33 His argument is based on the proclamation that the ''driving forces'' of international law-making are not immutable but subject to constant and contingent changes.
34 He claims that these driving forces are in fact variable ''common interests'' as compared to constant ''global values''. 35 The gist of his argument is that an agreement of the international community on a particular norm does not reflect common ground-an ultimate goal or value-on the basis of which it has accepted that norm, but is instead based solely on the self-serving reasons of states. For example, the norms relating to peace preservation are backed by the major powers because of a desire to avoid the detriments of war, whereas the small states back the prohibition on the use of force to protect themselves from the more powerful states.
36
Thus, while accepting the norm of prohibition on the use of force, states do not have a belief in the preservation of peace as an objective value represented by that norm.
How do we consolidate Koskenniemi's and d'Aspremont's views? While d'Aspremont's distinction between values and the mutualization of interests is particularly eccentric, as it deviates from the conventional understanding on the formation of values and undermines the role of values in the construction of norms in international law, there also appears to be something missing in this juxtaposition of law, politics, and individualism that patronizes the development of international law. These approaches appear to be a misreading of the study of values by presenting them as self-serving and lobbied preferences.
37 Where is the social element of law in these readings?
38 No society is composed of equals, and no norms emerge on the basis of equality among all subjects.
39 The same holds true for international society, which is highly pluralistic and heterogeneous. 40 The diverse process by which consensus is achieved for the formulation of norms does not change the basic ideals prevalent in and cherished by international society. There are certain social causes and ultimate purposes that international society strives to achieve.
41 International society may, however, be conceived of as an anarchic society as compared to a ''moral project'', 42 where one cannot categorically conclude that the members of this society do not share dominant values of state security and join the growing demand to
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ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1. 48 It can be done, however, in some cases: for ''aggression'', the corresponding value can clearly be identified as ''peace''; for ''self-determination'', ''freedom''; for ''self-defence'', the ''protection of life and property''; and for the term ''terrorist'', the value can be ''security''. This necessarily abstract norm/value juxtaposition may lead to different characterizations or may also result in the overlapping of two values in respect of one norm, or vice versa. For example, the corresponding value for ''aggression'' may be identified as ''security'' and for ''terrorism'' as ''peace''.
49 This overlapping in no way suggests that there exists no corresponding value for a given norm.
Jus cogens, in this way of estimation, refers to norms that are recognized as fundamental values 50 that have been fully internalized by international society. 51 Jus cogens, hence, can be termed value consensus or universal values. Most importantly, however, is that this value-internalization process in international law was based neither on the conversion of authority-seeking, lobbied, and politically motivated views into universal preferences nor on the self-serving reasons contemplated by d'Aspremont. There is a social element in the development of norms in international law that is based on the collective good of the society. Through the course of this
43.
Ibid., at 222. internalization process, the gradual realization by the international community of the social benefits secured by the resulting norms overpowered any differences arising from unilateral preferences or individual benefits. This internalization process represents a value system in international society, which not only explains norms in terms of values but also facilitates their hierarchical ordering in any given context. Koskenniemi's denial of the role of values in the development of international law is also based on the conceptual disagreement of the international community on the understanding of particular norms.
52 I, however, contend that the international community is not utterly divided on values in respect of the norms to which they correspond. In other words, while there might be disagreement on the conception of a norm, there is hardly any disagreement on its corresponding value. For example, there is no disagreement on the maintenance of ''peace'' in international relations, although there are disagreements on what constitutes ''aggression''. International law provides for a norm prohibiting aggression in view of the fact that it corresponds to the value of peace, representing the benefit and interest to all members of the international community whether perceived as weak or strong. Aggression, in whatever way defined, would amount to a disturbance of peace. The norms are, therefore, based on facts and are subject to interpretation, whereas values are based on the collective wisdom of the international community and subject to legal identification, allocation, and, in cases of conflict, hierarchical ordering. The disagreement might, however, be on the extent to which these values have been internalized by international society. The ILC Report has, in fact, suggested of this value orientation in the development of international law:
New types of specialized law do not emerge accidentally but seek to respond to new technical and functional requirements. The emergence of ''environmental law'' is a response to growing concern over the state of the international environment. ''Trade law'' develops as an instrument to regulate international economic relations. ''Human rights law'' aims to protect the interests of individuals and ''international criminal law'' gives legal expression to the ''fight against impunity''.
53
A significant problem with this legal evolution is illustrated by this question: What would happen when the norms in these legal specializations evolve in a way that they clash with each other? In international law, it has been presumed that there exists no predetermined authoritative hierarchy of values, 54 resolving any normative conflicts on an a priori basis. This primarily suggests that all values stand on equal footing since each one of them protects fundamental interests. It is generally recognized that any ambiguity regarding the meaning of a value-representing norm must be solved by interpretation.
55 Whether two conflicting norms can be reconciled is also a matter of interpretation. I contend, however, that if they cannot be so reconciled, the norm representing a higher-level value in the given context is to be preferred over the norm
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representing a lower-level value. In every civilized society, whether national or international, some interests are prioritized. This state of affairs subscribes to an inherent hierarchy of values based on the collective wisdom of the international community. Some norms have already attained the status of jus cogens through the norm-internalization process. These norms are superior to other norms and international society agrees that a norm amounting to jus cogens is to be prioritized over conflicting norms.
56 With respect to norms other than jus cogens, however, courts and dispute settlement bodies prioritize the most desired value at the expense of the other.
57 This ordering is a fundamental requirement for harmonious societal functioning.
58 If, for example, the norms of trade and human rights-neither of which has attained the status of jus cogens-cannot be simultaneously achieved, then the social needs of the international community determine how they are to be ordered.
The development of international legal norms, hence, is not solely based on hegemonic political choice; such development is rather based on social integration, corresponding to and resulting in an international civil society. The extent to which Koskenniemi undermines the role of civil society in the formation and development of international law is questionable. To proceed with the discussion of international law as a value-oriented system, it is helpful to import two quotes from Koskenniemi's article. On one occasion, he quotes Antonio Cassese as follows:
[A]t least at the normative level the international community is becoming more integrated and-what is even more important-y such values as human rights and the need to promote development are increasingly penetrating various sectors of international law that previously seemed impervious to them.
59
On another occasion, he quotes Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui as follows:
The resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of international law y has been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a law more readily seen as the reflection of a collective juridical conscience and a response to the social necessities of States organized as a community.
60
These quotes both refer to the gradual transformation of the international community as a society reflecting values that are realized through a gradual valueinternalization process. As stated earlier, this value-internalization process has already reached a consensus in the case of, for example, jus cogens. In international society, therefore, modern international law is evolving in the presence of complex international relations with various political motivations. In other words, there exists a quasi-natural social order in the development of international law.
61 Where the
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influence of political power in its formation and development cannot be completely ruled out, then the logical conclusion is that there are, notionally, two constructions of international law. There is, on the one hand, a top-down construction where international law is developing under the influence of political power, as suggested by Koskenniemi. 62 On the other hand, as proclaimed by Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, there is a bottom-up construction where international law is evolving in a way similar to domestic laws in that it is influenced by the social necessities of the states comprising the community. In this regard, Koskenniemi at one occasion also appears to have conceded the latter type of construction:
Freedom and equality, however, can be realised only if the international world is understood as a political community, that is, a form of interaction where social power turns into political authority through claims about rights and duties that are universalisable, that is, claims of law.
63
The ICL Report has also reflected a similar opinion:
A law that would fail to articulate the experienced differences between fact-situations or between the interests or values that appear relevant in particular problem-areas would seem altogether unacceptable, utopian and authoritarian simultaneously.
64
A third construction of international law is a hybrid of the above two constructions, where there are many actors, some top-down and some bottom-up. This construction, which reflects the divided interests of the international community, is perhaps closer to the thinking of d'Aspremont. In this context, however, d'Aspremont has rightly pointed out that the wellbeing of individuals is subject to continuous reappraisal and is fundamentally relative.
65 This relativity is, as we shall see later, a necessary part of the solution to normative conflict in the decentralized system of international law. Once we revert to values to explain norms, we can not only understand norms in the light of the interests they serve but also solve normative conflicts, whether in treaties or elsewhere, by assigning a contextual hierarchy. This relative-as compared to an absolute-hierarchy is more feasible and accommodating, given the evolving normative structure of international society as compelled by the continuous changes in the preferences of its members. This evolution will ultimately lead to an absolute hierarchy, if required and agreed to by the international society, as in the case of jus cogens.
''Regionalism'', which calls for values to be perceived in regional contexts and therefore divides international society into distinct groups, is a possible attack on the advocated ''universalism'' of values. The regionalism argument surfaced in the formation and development of international law on the basis of legal orientations and methods adopted by a particular group of states-for example, Anglo-American,
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European, Soviet, Third World, or Asian. 66 Regionalism is also analyzed as an instrument of hegemony where hegemonic blocks are created by ''[a] great power in order to ensure supremacy or to redress the balance of power disturbed by the activities of another power elsewhere in the world''.
67 It is also frequently used as an explanation for rules that originated from or are identified with a specific territorythe Calvo, Drago, and Tobar doctrines, for example-and that operate as an exception to the general principles of international law.
68
Regionalism is a major obstacle to any universalist international legal order,
69
as it suggests the absence of a universal character of values, and therefore of the resulting norm formation.
70 For example, political leaders and intellectuals in the economically successful societies of Southeast Asia used regionalism to question the universality of human rights by referring to ''Asian Values''. 71 The claim of ''Asian Values'' proposes that human-rights norms can be weighed differently in Asia than, for example, in the European Union, when they conflict with other norms like trade or investment. Although regionalism is believed to have little normative import,
72
and rarely takes the shape of a general ''rule'' or a ''principle'', 73 it nevertheless connotes a ''rule or a principle with a regional sphere of validity or a regional limitation to the sphere of validity of a universal rule or principle''.
74 This suggests that regionalism is a kind of lex specialis, 75 and calls for different hierarchies of conflicting norms and values. 76 The idea of Asian Values subjects the evaluation of norms and values to specific cultural environments and presupposes that the norm-creation and value-internalization processes stand at different stages in different parts of the world.
ii. treaty conflict in international law
Treaties are an important source of international law, and are frequently the forerunners of its developments. 78 Borgen suggests that ''the viability of international law, as a legal system, rests largely on the viability of treaties as a source of law''. 
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By their contractual nature, treaties are horizontal instruments that have no inherent priority over each other. Treaties, however, perform important functions in the formation of norms in international law, which may be understood in the light of the value-oriented underpinnings on the construction and development of international law. The ILC Report provides that although there is no single legislative will behind international law (which may not, however, always be the case), 80 legal reasoning involves an objective analysis of rules incorporated in treaties:
[I]f legal reasoning is understood as a purposive activity, then it follows that it should be seen not merely as a mechanic application of apparently random rules, decisions or behavioural patterns but as the operation of a whole that is directed toward some human objective. Again, lawyers may disagree about what the objective of a rule or behaviour is. But it does not follow that no such objective at all can be envisaged. (emphasis in the original)
81
Koskenniemi also has suggested:
Legal reason is a hierarchical form of reason, establishing relationships of inferiority and superiority between units and levels of legal discourse. [Koskenniemi then references this statement and further explains.] A unit (or topos) of legal discourse is any distinguishable entity of legal meaning; a level is a group of topoi identifiable by a common property. To speak of levels instead of groups is to highlight the hierarchical character of the principles of identification. Thus, regular treaty provisions constitute topoi that are normally situated at a level different from the topoi of legislative purpose or principle underlying the treaty. (emphasis in the original)
82
For the purposes of legal discourse, the juxtaposition of norms and values suggests something akin to Koskenniemi's division, that is, the norms are the units and values are the levels constituted by a group of norms identifiable by a common property. Treaty norms (units) may represent only a mutual value (level) between the states party to that treaty or a universal value (higher level), 83 depending on the legislative purpose or principles underlying the treaty. In Koskenniemi's terms this amounts to ''[a] systematization [that] aims to make explicit the origin and relationship of norms so as to answer questions about normative authority and to solve problems of normative conflict''.
84 The legal discourse of studying treaty norms in terms of values has a twofold outcome. First, and obviously, it suggests that these norms should be studied in the broader context of the values they represent. Conflict in treaties can thus be understood as conflicts of values in the international society.
85 Second, it
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allows the possibility that some treaty norms stand superior to other conflicting ones, depending upon the values they represent. Treaty conflicts are commonly analyzed in terms of rights and obligations created by treaty norms, rendering treaties as bundles of public or private rights and obligations.
86 This suggests that treaty conflicts can be resolved by balancing the rights guaranteed by the norms. 87 The balancing of rights, however, leads to a discussion regarding the ''right-obligation'' equation, that is, who holds what rights and by whom, against whom, and on what legal basis those rights can be enforced or prioritized.
88 In this regard, the arguments in this article do not derive from the socalled deontic logic that understands rights in the context of obligations.
89 In contrast to ''rights'' and their ''balancing'', the arguments in this article are based on ''interests'' and their ''valuing'' (levelling in terms of determining hierarchy).
In this vein, the arguments in this article have been developed on the basis of ''interests'' representing ''values'', as compared to rights and duties, and differ from Ronald Dworkin's ''rule-principle'' paradigm in three ways.
90 First, as compared to the determination of an objective hierarchy, the deontic content of the rule-principle approach calls for a corrective stance on the part of courts in terms of the ''rightwrong'' equation, that is, right as compared to its opposite (wrong).
91 This approach works well only where one of the conflicting treaty norms is jus cogens, thus rendering the other norm void, 92 but cannot be applied where the equation is rather ''right-right'' or when the conflicting treaties give ''right'' norms that conflict with each other. Second, the deontic approach may lead to understanding treaty conflict in terms of a ''right-obligation'' equation in which a conflict between two norms arises only where a party to two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with both treaties' ''obligations''.
93 This leads to an analysis of the conflict of treaty norms in terms of treaty obligations having corresponding rights, as compared to mere ''permissive'' or ''voluntary'' obligations, and suggests that a norm that creates an obligation having a corresponding right should be prioritized over one that is only permissive and voluntary and whose violation does not infringe any rights.
94 This approach is obviously unhelpful where both norms create obligations that have corresponding rights. Finally, the abstract subtext of rules and principles, suggested by the deontic 
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approach, 95 leaves room for political preference to justify the prioritization of one principle over the other. 96 The perception of treaty conflict in terms of competing rights or obligations, however, remains relevant to understanding the factual nature of a conflict.
97
As compared to rights, an interest is:
[A] demand or desire or expectation which human beings, either individually or in groups or associations or relations, seek to satisfy, of which, therefore, the adjustment of human relations and ordering of human behaviour through the force of politically organized society must take account.
98
Interests are required to be protected and are fundamentally relative in their legal character. Pound explains the relativity of interests as follows:
[I]nterests y as they cannot all be secured, much less fully secured since many of them overlap and many are more or less in conflict, questions arise which are fundamental for legislative lawmaker and frequently confront the courts in choice of starting points for reasoning, in interpretation, and in application of standards,[cit] namely, how are these interests to be weighed.
[cit] How are they to be valued? What principle to determine their relative weight? Which shall give way in case of conflict?
99
A levelling among conflicting interests can, therefore, be achieved even when the interests stand on equal footing, which may be determined by an estimation of the stage reached by the value-internalization process of such interests. An interest may have become a custom or jus cogens. This suggests that in international civil society a hierarchy of values exists that is both predetermined, in the case of one of the conflicting norms is jus cogens, and relative, as in other cases. This hierarchy, both pre-and post-determined, is established on the basis of interests and values protected by norms, and enables the ordering of conflicting norms. In other words, other than normative conflicts involving jus cogens, this hierarchy can only be determined through a contextual evaluation and not by a general rule.
100
The ILC Report concedes to this objectivism when it comes to solving normative conflicts: ''[m]oving from the prima facie view to a conclusion, legal reasoning will either have to seek to harmonize the apparently conflicting standards through interpretation or, if that seems implausible, to establish definite relationships of priority between them''.
101
In the face of a weaker institutional structure of international law, the members of the ILC were aware of the problems confronting such a hierarchal ordering of norms.
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102
Appropriate interpretive tools and legal devices are, nonetheless, required for the legal determination of normative treaty conflicts. The existing legal framework for such resolution in international law, available both within and outside of the VCLT, 103 however, fails to provide an appropriate, principled, and legal solution for the resolution of treaty conflicts.
iii. treaty conflicts and the despondency of the vclt and other rules and principles of international law
As discussed earlier, treaty conflicts can be identified as conflicting state obligations acquired under two treaties. 104 They give rise to problems regarding the validity or enforceability of conflicting state obligations.
105 More precisely, a conflict or incompatibility arises where two obligations cannot be complied with by all addressees of the obligations under all conditions so specified.
106 Article 30 of the VCLT contains three tests for the application of the lex posterior rule to resolve the problem of conflicting treaty obligations: The VCLT's techniques to solve treaty conflicts have been criticized as unhelpful.
108 While its rules are workable where parties to an earlier and a later treaty are the same, there are problems with the determination of the subject matter of treaties as well as the time of their conclusion.
109 The subject matter of a treaty is the interest it primarily purports to protect, 110 but may encompass specific norms embodying interests to which it does not specifically refer. In other words, an investmentprotection treaty may expressly or impliedly contain norms governing human rights. The subject matter of two treaties is the same when any norm incorporated in one treaty is incompatible with that in another.
111 In other words, the subject matter of two treaties is the same when their individual norms generate a clash of interest.
112
That a series of treaties dealing with different subject matter create complementary relationships between old and new treaties has been suggested.
113 For example, with respect to certain bilateral and trilateral treaties on the legal status of the Caspian Sea 114 and the recent Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, 115 Russia has adopted a ''stage approach'' whereby specific agreements, such as on fishing, are considered as ''incremental'' to a comprehensive agreement.
116 In this sense, the subject matter of two treaties can be treated as the same when any terms defined or norms incorporated in two or more such treaties reciprocate each other, even if both treaties deal with different subject matter.
117 The Russian ''stage approach'' to the Caspian Sea agreements that deal with apparently different subject matter and have been inter se concluded between different members of the Caspian Sea littoral states would highly complicate (if not render entirely unmanageable) the application of the Article 30 VCLT tests for the resolution of potential conflicts between these treaties.
Furthermore, adjudicators faced with a treaty that has possibly conflicting objects identify its subject matter in the light of its ''primary'' object. If all specific agreements are included in a comprehensive treaty on the status of the Caspian Sea, such a treaty will create a situation like that addressed by Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT occasionally conflicting norms (trade liberalization and environmental protection) in GATT compelled the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to look into the object of the GATT to determine which of these norms should prevail when they conflict.
120
For example, in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute, 121 certain governments challenged US-imposed embargos on the import of shrimp or shrimp products harvested in conditions that allegedly affected sea turtles, on the grounds that those conditions were not covered by the exceptions under Article XX(b) and (g) GATT.
122 The DSB interpreted Article XX GATT in purview of its primary objective, which was to protect the multilateral trading system, and concluded that the measures taken by the US under Article XX GATT operated as a trade restriction in violation of the WTO Agreement.
123 The delineation between the primary and secondary purposes of a multipurpose treaty further obscures the application of the Article 30 VCLT's subject-matter test to resolve treaty conflicts.
In respect of the chronology of adoption or accession of treaties, the lex posterior rule provided by the VCLT sometimes fails to offer a certain and adequate solution for normative conflict, and its opposite, the lex prior rule, may be considered as appropriate in certain instances of conflict.
A. Uncertainty Regarding Lex Posterior and Lex Prior Rules
If two conflicting treaties deal with the same subject matter and are concluded by the same parties, then, according to the lex posterior rule promulgated by Article 59 VCLT, the later treaty shall prevail. An example is the decision of Argentina's Cá mara Nacional Especial in Cía. Territorial de Seguras (S.A.) v. The Clara Y.
124 The case dealt with the 1879 Montevideo Convention and the 1910 Brussels Convention, both of which bound Argentina and provided conflicting rules regarding the temporal limitations of maritime collision claims. The Court ruled it a classic principle of law that ''a later legislative act will supersede an earlier one''.
125
The lex posterior rule, however, cannot solve all types of treaty conflicts and its opposite, the lex prior rule, may sometimes be applied. For example, the World Court applied lex prior instead of lex posterior in the Reservations of the Genocide Convention.
126 The Court pronounced as generally recognized the principle that parties to a multilateral convention are not entitled to conclude an agreement that frustrates or impairs its purpose and raison d'être. 130 The uncertainty in the application of lex posterior or lex prior rules to resolve treaty conflicts threatens the predictability of their application:
If the lex prior has general application in contract law, lex posterior has in public law and legislative enactments. So the relationship between the two reflects on the way one views the nature of treaties. Both analogies, however, have their problems.
131
Neither rule, therefore, provides certainty in the resolution of treaty conflicts. Pauwelyn suggests that certain conflicts may be solved by disapplying the VCLT's temporal rules, 132 and argues that the contents of most multilateral treaties evolve through the interpretation of and application to emerging situations by judicial bodies, as well as the accession of new states.
133 The United Nations (UN) Charter as it was in 1945 is not how it is today.
134 As it is consequently impossible to resolve treaty conflicts effectively by applying either the lex posterior or lex prior rule, Pauwelyn instead suggests the lex specialis rule or that the special norm should prevail over a general norm.
135 This rule, as applied in its various forms, also cannot, however, resolve treaty conflicts in an orderly manner.
B. Incompetence of Lex Specialis as a Tool to Resolve Treaty Conflicts
The principle lex specialis derogat lege generali or ''special law derogates from general law'' is a widely accepted maxim of legal interpretation and a technique for the resolution of normative conflicts.
136 There are, however, problems with its precise definition.
137 Pauwelyn considers lex specialis to be as effective as lex posterior for the determination of the most current expression of the state's will. 138 The ILC Report has devoted significant attention to lex specialis, 139 and portrays it as either a ''new interpretation'' of the general law or an exception to it. 140 The words ''new interpretation'' presuppose the existence of an uncontroversial or exhaustive interpretation of a general rule, which overlooks the fact that the policy considerations of different institutions applying the general rule may trigger its varying interpretations. This aspect of lex specialis makes it perhaps more suitable for the establishment of political preferences rather than normative determination. The interpretive divide of different institutions, therefore, may well be classified as an institutional or systems conflict rather than a rationality conflict.
141 For instance, a trade institution like the WTO 142 and a human-rights institution like the ECtHR may have conflicting interpretations of one rule, owing to the difference in their perspectives. Which of the two interpretations is to be recognized as a new interpretation or a lex specialis? Designating a new interpretation of a norm as lex specialis, therefore, appears to be a misreading of the interpretation of lex specialis as a general rule of treaty interpretation. While it could be argued that this reading is helpful in resolving normative conflicts within a particular system, rationality conflicts arise where a specialized institution is required to apply and interpret norms from the perspective of another system (for example, a trade body applying or interpreting a norm from the perspective of environmental law).
143 This rationality conflict would only be resolved by establishing a priority between conflicting norms and/or their interpretations. Such conflicts are essentially value conflicts and not merely normative conflicts, and these, I contend, cannot be resolved by available interpretive devices and harmonizing maxims such as lex specialis.
The definition of lex specialis as a rule that operates as an exception to the general law is equally unhelpful in resolving institutional conflicts. In its narrower sense, lex specialis is considered a conflict-resolution technique for when two valid and applicable legal provisions provide incompatible directions for the same facts.
144 In this situation, the ILC Report suggests that the ''special'' provision, that is, the rule with a more precisely ''delimited scope of application'', should be prioritized.
145 It concedes the difficulty of determining the ''delimited scope of application'' of a rule, and acknowledges the indeterminate nature of the ''substantive coverage'' of a provision and its legal subjects. The ILC Report has also suggested that conflicts between a territorially limited general regime and a universal treaty can only be decided on their ''merits'', and not on the basis of lex specialis,
146 without explaining what those ''merits'' are. The ILC Report also admits problems with the application of lex specialis in contrast to a general rule protecting an objective sociological interest 147 and possibly enjoying hierarchical status. Lex specialis, as an exception to a general rule, nevertheless remains helpful in resolving conflicts arising within a regime, especially where a treaty itself provides special rules of priority; even if it is unhelpful in the context of a regime-to-regime conflict.
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After admitting the indeterminate nature of the ''substantive coverage'' of a provision and the number of legal subjects to whom it applies, the ILC Report nevertheless attempts to distinguish the application of the maxim with regard to parties and the subject matter.
150 With regard to the parties, it concludes that where a state has undertaken conflicting obligations towards two or more states, the lex specialis approach is largely irrelevant, 151 and inevitable recourse must be had to political determination.
152 With regard to the subject matter, the lex specialis rule may operate as a conflict-resolving technique only when both the general and special rule deal with the same subject matter.
153 The requirement of the same subject matter effectively rules out the capacity of lex specialis to resolve regime-to-regime conflicts, such as human rights and investment regimes, as the two regimes deal with different subject matter.
The ILC's defiance of the role of these interpretive maxims (lex specialis, lex generalis, lex prior, and lex posterior) therefore appears to be more accommodating of value orientation in the legal reasoning for the resolution of treaty conflicts, as explained below:
They [lex specialis, lex generalis, lex prior, and lex posterior] enable seeing a systemic relationship between two or more rules, and may thus justify a particular choice of the applicable standards, and a particular conclusion. They do not do this mechanically, however, but rather as ''guidelines'',[cit] suggesting a pertinent relationship between the relevant rules in view of the need for consistency of the conclusion with the perceived purposes or functions of the legal system as a whole. (emphasis added)
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On another occasion, again referring to the interpretive maxims, the ILC Report provides:
This [the inefficiency of lex specialis, lex generalis, lex prior, and lex posterior] reflected the pragmatic sense that some criteria are, in particular contexts, more important than others 2 for example because they better secure important interests or protect important values. (emphasis added)
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The ILC's references to the purposes or functions of the international legal structure and pragmatic treaty interpretation to secure certain interests and values clearly reveal the value-oriented components of the international legal framework and their role in the resolution of treaty conflicts. Lex specialis, therefore, either as a new interpretation or an exception to a general rule, does not solve all types of treaty conflicts; and neither do the temporal rules of lex posterior and lex prior. Apart from these rules, which deal with the chronology and subject matter of treaties, the VCLT rules relating to parties in successive but conflicting treaties are also unhelpful in resolving treaty conflicts.
C. Problems with the VCLT Rules where Parties to an Earlier Treaty are Different from Parties to a Subsequent Conflicting Treaty
The VCLT rules governing the conflict of two treaties between the same states are relatively unambiguous and helpful, and its rules dealing with successive treaties involving different states are problematic. 156 Article 30(4) VCLT, which deals with the ''application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter'' that involve different parties, provides:
When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
(a) As between states parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
[the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty]
(b) As between a state party to both treaties and a state party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both states are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.
(emphasis added)
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By virtue of Article 30(4)(b), the resolution of treaty conflicts between different states favours the preservation of the validity of both incompatible treaties rather than determining priority inter se. Article 30 declares neither of the treaties, nor their conflicting norms, void or superseded. On the contrary, a state can choose which obligation to violate in the light of the ''relative effects'' of such violations, or what is commonly referred to as the ''principle of political decision''.
158 In other words, the VCLT shifts the focus from the normative prioritization of the conflicting treaties to state responsibility under international law for the treaty violation.
159 Article 30(5) VCLT affirms this position by making the application of Article 30(4) without prejudice to the responsibility of a state for a treaty violation due to the legal consequences of incompatibility maintained by Article 30(4).
The shift from normative determination to political preference allows the state to violate the less onerous treaty obligation, even though in so doing it would also violate fundamental interests of both individual actors and the international society. 156. Ghouri, supra note 107 at 8-10. 157. VCLT supra note 2, art. 30(4). 158. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 88 and 91. 159. Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 4 at 72. 160. Such fundamental interests can be viewed in the context of an individual as well as the national and international societies at large, the observance of which is of fundamental importance to the international community as a whole. See Weil, supra note 13 at 424.
D. The Principle of Political Decision in the Resolution of Treaty Conflicts
In applying the ''principle of political decision'', a state may arbitrarily choose one treaty obligation over another conflicting one. 161 The principle of political decision, whether termed as a ''right'' or a ''power'' of election, 162 cannot solve treaty conflicts neutrally.
163
First, the principle does not provide a ''principled method'' of resolution, as it deals not with legal principle but with power and politics. 164 Consequently, it undermines the basic goal of treaty-making, namely, decreasing the politicization of international relations and increasing rule-based decision-making and conflict resolution.
165 Second, the principle provides no guidance where values conflict, as a state can opt for a treaty norm representing trade values over one representing human rights. The question arises as to whether the decision of states to prefer one treaty over another is based purely on political considerations? Klabbers, for instance, opposes the treatment of the political decision principle as a general principle of law.
166 Just as he is convinced that political judgements may not always be for the better, 167 he is also convinced that co-ordination mechanisms
168
to resolve treaty conflicts would be unable to solve the value conflicts. 169 Still he holds that the problem of conflicting treaties cannot be solved on the basis of a value-based approach: He seems not to be referring to the levelling of values inter se but rather to the disagreement on the universal acceptance of one value as a value per se. He further states:
But that is not to deny that much international politics (and international law, by extension) takes place so as to promote certain values over others: indeed, for that very reason, sometimes fairly innocent treaty conflicts come to be recast as value clashes y
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While he seems to be agreeing with this article, he concludes that international law cannot resolve this clash of values.
172 He correctly observes that conflicting treaty norms covering the same subject matter can be resolved by balancing the rights 161. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 88; see also discussions in Section III(C) of this article. concerned. 173 I believe that this balancing is also possible where treaties deal with different subject matter (for example, trade and the environment), by treating normative conflicts as value conflicts that require the ordering of interests.
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According to Klabbers, international law solves treaty conflicts by forcing a choice of one value over another, which means that treaty conflicts cannot be solved when this choice is impossible.
175 He posits that this choice must be based on what constitutes a good life.
176 He seems to have overlooked the fact that the issue is not a ''good life'' sometimes, but life itself, as was seen in Charles D. Short v. The State of Netherlands [Short] .
177 Mr Short, a member of the US military and based in the Netherlands, pleaded guilty to murdering his wife. The 1953 NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), binding both the US and the Netherlands, required his transfer to US authorities, where he could be punished by death under US law. The Sixth Schedule of the ECHR, which binds the Netherlands, prohibits the death penalty in all circumstances. The Court acknowledged both the conflict between the SOFA and the ECHR and the absence of a rule in international law that would resolve the conflict. It nevertheless ranked the competing interests implicated, not leaving the matter for political determination by the Netherlands, 178 and ultimately prioritized the interest of an individual (Mr Short) over that of NATO.
179 If the ECHR had left this decision to the Netherlands, the Netherlands could have chosen to extradite Mr Short for political reasons.
Klabbers posits that the Short Court acknowledged only a clash of interests and not a clash of values, and argues that the ''national and international interests'' in this case were abstracted to the point that they would cover all agreements.
180 Klabbers appears to have reached this conclusion because he perhaps understood ''interests'' in terms of ''rights'' having corresponding ''obligations''.
181 In contrast to Klabbers, I contend that the question before the Court was not whether the conflicting interests have value but rather how these interests should be ordered. While ordering the conflicting interests, the Court took them all into account and prioritized that which gave the most effect to the totality as far as possible and with the least sacrifice.
182 This ordering is no doubt ''relative'' and can only be determined through a contextual evaluation and not by any general rule.
183 The ordering process, therefore, determines hierarchy between existence of a treaty conflict. 194 Borgen, however, has rightly noted that these harmonizing efforts 195 may resolve apparent but not genuine conflicts. 196 The ECtHR has, nonetheless, resolved the problem of genuine treaty conflict in Soering and Matthews.
197
In Soering,
198 the US, pursuant to the UK-US extradition treaty, 199 sought the extradition of Soering, a German citizen detained in a UK prison, for offences carrying the death penalty. In accordance with the Article 4 of the Treaty, the UK had secured a waiver from the US of the death penalty if extradition was approved. Unsatisfied with the US assurances on this matter, Soering unsuccessfully petitioned the English Courts for judicial review, which led to his application to the ECtHR that extradition would lead to a serious likelihood of his execution in the US. In addition to the death penalty itself, he also claimed that the circumstances surrounding this punishment, like the likelihood of an extended period on death row, would constitute inhuman or degrading punishment contrary to ECHR Article 3, 200 which binds the UK but not the US.
The EU Commission argued as established law that ECHR Article 3 is implicated when there are serious reasons to believe that a person's extradition would lead to the receiving state treating the person in a manner contrary to Article 3. 201 The UK characterized the EU Commission's approach as an interference with international treaty rights, leading to a conflict with the norms of international judicial process.
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As such interference would involve adjudication on the affairs of states not party to the ECHR, the UK further argued that this would require the Court to examine alien systems of law and conditions in foreign states, cause a serious risk of harm in the ECHR party state that is obliged to harbour the protected person, and leave criminals at large and unpunished.
While the Court observed that the ECHR neither governs the actions of non-party states nor requires contracting states to impose ECHR standards on other states, 203 it acknowledged the incompatibility of the obligations acquired by the UK under the extradition treaty and the ECHR. 
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The Court observed that the absence of a specific obligation in the ECHR that a party state refrain from extraditing fugitives when there are substantial grounds for believing they would be subjected to conduct in violation of the treaty 209 does not mean that such an obligation is not already inherent in Article 3. The Court unflinchingly declared that:
It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that ''common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law'' to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article, and in the Court's view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article.
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The Soering Court declared that the ECHR obligation would prevail at the expense of another obligation acquired by a party state on behalf of a third state. It could not have been clearer about prioritizing the interest of the individual, as embodied in the ECHR, over the obligation embodied by the extradition treaty, on the basis of a value-based hierarchy between the two norms.
211 ECHR Article 3, according to the Court, contains a non-refoulement obligation that prohibits the UK from transferring a person to the US if a real risk of that person being subjected to inhuman treatment in the US was established.
212 On the other hand, however, was the UK/US extradition treaty that required the UK to extradite Soering, without exception. Both treaty norms provided obligations for which there were corresponding rights, and the normative conflict between the ECHR and the UK/US extradition treaty could only be resolved by establishing a hierarchy between the conflicting treaty norms in terms of their represented values and protected interests.
213 Instead of leaving the matter for the UK to decide, possibly based on political considerations, the Court determined an objective hierarchy between the conflicting treaty norms.
By prioritizing the non-refoulement obligation over the extradition obligation, the Court neither pronounced the non-refoulement obligation as jus cogens nor declared the UK/US extradition treaty void.
214 On the contrary, it created an exception based on value-oriented reasoning. The Court did not deny the beneficial interest of extradition in preventing fugitive offenders from evading justice, 215 but instead declared that the non-refoulement norm represented an interest that was superior to it. This non-refoulement interest may indeed attain the status of jus cogens, 216 and only then can it declare a conflicting treaty void.
217 And in that case, it will be unnecessary to have a convention like the ECHR to establish the right of the individual. By creating this exception, the Court has nonetheless contributed to this value-internalization process and set a precedent.
218
In Matthews, the Court dealt with both the ECHR, which qualified the European Parliament (EP) as a legislature in respect of which states had to organize free elections, and a treaty concluded among the EU members that prohibited the UK from extending the franchise for the EP to Gibraltar. 219 The context was the election in Gibraltar for the EP. The Court found the UK responsible for violating the ECHR, irrespective of its other treaty obligations. The applicant alleged a violation of her right to free election under ECHR Article 3 Protocol 1. While the Court did not find this right absolute, it observed that the conditions imposed on it must neither impair the very essence of the right to vote nor render it ineffective and must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim; as well, the means employed must not be disproportionate.
220
In addition to a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, 221 the applicant also alleged discrimination in violation of ECHR Article 14. 222 The Court did not find it necessary to consider the latter as it had already found a violation of the former. In EC-Asbestos, the AB, referring to Korea-Beef, noted:
''[T]he more vital or important [the] common interests or values'' pursued, the easier it would be to accept as ''necessary'' measures designed to achieve those ends.[cit.] In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the preservation of human life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The value pursued is both vital and important in the highest degree.
235
This time, the AB found that the impugned European Community's measure was indeed ''necessary'' to protect human health.
While questions relating to treaty conflicts may inevitably become necessary for the resolution of a matter, the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals over treaty conflicts is complicated. It might be considered limited to the application of a specific treaty or set of treaties, 236 and tribunals may have an exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from a particular treaty. 237 Likewise, the jurisdiction of dispute-settlement tribunals may be limited by the treaty itself to issues arising under it. 238 In this manner, then, treaties may be treated as self-contained regimes. 239 It cannot be stipulated, however, that such regimes are entirely self-contained.
The WTO is perhaps the most prominent example of a self-contained regime.
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Shrimp-Turtle, Reformulated Gasoline, EC-Asbestos, 241 and Korea-Beef, 242 however, reveal that the jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is not limited to matters pertaining to trade alone. In Shrimp-Turtle, the DSB Panel in fact looked into whether any other treaty obligated the US to take the measures that allegedly violated the WTO Agreement. 243 In this regard, the ILC Report has rightly distinguished between the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal and the scope of applicable law in the interpretation and application of a treaty; for example, while the jurisdiction of the DSU is limited to the application of the WTO Agreement, there is no explicit provision limiting the applicable law to its normative framework.
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A tribunal may, on the other hand, have extensive jurisdiction to entertain all matters that relate to or affect the subject matter of a treaty. For example, Article 25(1) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) 245 provides that the jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment. States must consent to ICSID jurisdiction, however, by including, for example, a general dispute-resolution clause in their bilateral investment treaty (BIT). 246 Once a state's consent is established, any state measure in respect of human rights or the environment that offsets the legitimate expectations of an investor will bring the dispute within ICSID's jurisdiction. When those measures are based on treaties other than the BIT, tribunals would indeed be empowered to exercise jurisdiction to entertain arguments based on other treaty regimes. 247 Though the ICSID Convention allows disputing parties to choose the law applicable to their dispute, the fall-back provision for the application of international law in the case of disagreement between parties would effectively bring the application of other treaty regimes to an investment dispute. 248 Furthermore, even if the parties opt to consider the investment-treaty regime as a self-contained regime, tribunals may still apply the enabling rules of international law contained in other regimes when it is unable to find guidance on a particular issue in the investment treaty itself. 249 The ILC Report remarks on the scenario of jurisdiction of courts and tribunals as follows:
[I]t has never been seriously doubted by any international tribunal or treaty-body, namely that even as the jurisdiction of a body is limited (as it always -even in the case of the International Court of Justice -is), its exercise of that jurisdiction is controlled by the normative environment.
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According to Schwarzenberger, when a court or tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with only one of the conflicting treaties, it would always be entitled to claim jurisdiction over matters that are incidental to its decision on the main issue.
251
Interestingly, and also correctly, Schwarzenberger suggests that a court or tribunal is required to exercise jurisdiction over conflicting treaties in order to properly discharge its duty of determining their accumulative legal effects.
v. conclusion
The most important conclusion to be drawn from this research is that the outright disregard of values in the international normative framework is manifestly fallacious. In international society, common values are identified and recognized by states even though they operate according to different ideologies. All norms are value norms since they protect interests for which members of international society require protection. These values directly conflict on occasion and thereby require ordering by way of determining hierarchy. The value-internalization process in international society is pursuing gradual value optimization where norms like jus cogens have already achieved an absolute superiority over other norms. The conception of norms without values is misconceived and the discourse to resolve normative conflict devoid of value orientation is unprincipled, misleading, and ineffective.
Norms are subject to interpretation and may be applied and interpreted differently by the various institutions entrusted with their interpretation.
253 In other words, there is no solitary and consistent meaning ascribed to a particular norm. However, once we resolve that every norm has a corresponding value in terms of the interests it is meant to protect, then the question of the existence or recognition of a particular value fades away. This value-orientation of norms not only helps in understanding normative conflicts but also facilitates the prioritization of competing norms.
Another important conclusion is that a description of the conflict of a particular norm in one treaty with a norm contained in another treaty in terms of rights and obligations moves the treaty conflict up a level of abstraction into the subtext of rules and principles suggested by the deontic approach. Any normative hierarchy in the deontic context either results in the nullification of one of the conflicting norms or brings in an unworkable debate of corresponding obligations. Understanding norms in terms of rules and principles is also unhelpful in the resolution of conflicts as it leads to the political preference of one principle over another, depending upon which a state chooses in the relevant situation.
We have also learned that the international law rules both inside and outside the framework of the VCLT (lex posterior, lex prior, and lex specialis) do not provide adequate solutions to the normative conflict found in treaties. For the purposes of hierarchy, treaty norms are better understood in terms of values protecting interests. The estimation of values is not restricted to mere regular devices of treaty interpretation; that is, textual or contextual analysis, employed for the determination of disputes over the meaning of a particular treaty norm. It goes well beyond that into the objective exploration of social necessities as represented in values for the purposes of calculating a relative hierarchy of interests. The regular devices to resolve treaty conflicts fall back on the principle of political decision, which is unpredictable and is not a principle at all in the legal sense of the term since it does not involve legal reasoning or rationality. The principle of political decision is meant to preserve not the interests of individuals or a society but the political interests of states. Moreover, resort to this non-legal principle does not solve the actual normative conflicts.
